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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)
>

Plaintiff-Respondent,

•

>
)

-v-

>

Case No. 14004

>

GUS WILLIAM SIMPSON,

)
>

Defendant-Appellant.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case wherein the appellant appeals from a
conviction of illegal possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter came before the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge
of the District Court for San Juan County, sitting without a jury, on the
3rd and 4th days of December, 1974. The court took this matter under
advisement for approximately one month; then, on the 15th day of January,
1975, the appellant was found guilty of illegal possession of a controlled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

substance with intent to distribute for value. On the 19th day of February,
1975, the appellant was sentenced for not more than five years in the Utah
State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction because (1) the
marijuana seized by the state police officers was the product of an illegal
search and seizure; (2) the appellant was interrogated while in custody
without being informed of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
of the United States Constitution; and (3) the Utah courts lack jurisdiction
to convict the appellant of the crime for which he was charged and convicted.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about the 15th day of May, 1974, the appellant was piloting
a small single-engine aircraft from Mexico to Idaho (R. 79, 117, 123).
Needing fuel to reach his destination in Idaho, he landed the aircraft at the
Blanding airstrip at approximately 2:30 a.m. (R. 8, 123). Finding no one
present to help him refuel the plane, the appellant taxied it to the end of the
airstrip to wait until daylight (R. 10, 129, 130). After observing the
appellant's conduct at the airstrip, the airport manager called the police
because he was suspicious that the appellant wanted to rob something from
the other planes tied down at the airstrip (R. 11). Three policemen arrived
at the airport to investigate (Rc 12). While two of them approached the
aircraft by driving a police car along the runway with the headlights off, the
third officer on foot circled behind the aircraft and approached it from an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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opposite direction (Re 13, 72) 0 The three officers reached the aircraft
simultaneously (R. 39). The officers in the police car turned on their
headlights and shined a spotlight on the plane while the third officer
closed in on foot with a gun in his hand (R. 39, 132). The appellant knew
he was surrounded by police and felt that if he had moved, they would
have shot him (R. 133). One of the policemen arriving in the police car
located the appellant some thirty feet from the plane (R. 40, 63) and
asked him for some identification (R. 42, 146) while the officer behind
the appellant asked him about the contents of the airplane (R. 147). The
appellant responded that the plane was "loaded with pot" (Rc 52, 149).
The police officers then placed the appellant under arrest (Rc 52), read
him the Miranda warning (Rc 53), searched his person (R. 54), handcuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car (R. 55) 0 One officer then
radioed to Monticello for more assistance (R. 55, 67). Some minutes
later, two more officers arrived (R 0 68) . Traveling from Monticello to
the Blanding airport, the two officers passed by the offices of two
justices of the peace (R. 67, 116). Yet, they failed to obtain a search
warrant (R« 68).
The policemen approached the plane, smelled an odor which
they believed to be marijuana, and observed a number of packages
wrapped in plastic located in the interior of the plane (R. 56). They
searched the plane, took photographs (R. 68, 69), and removed the
packages (R. 80, 102). All this was done without a search warrant (R. 68).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The packages were found to contain marijuana (R. 92).
On the 15th day of January, 1975, the Honorable Edward Sheya,
Judge for the District Court of San Juan County, Utah, sitting without a jury,
found the appellant guilty of illegal possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§ 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1973) (R. 159). On the 19th day of February,
1975, the appellant was sentenced to not more than five years in the Utah
State Prison (R. 186).
In finding the appellant guilty, the lower court determined that
the appellant's statement that the plane was 'loaded with potM was admissible
as evidence regardless of the fact that when the statement was made the
appellant was surrounded by police officers, that one of the officers had a
gun in his hand, and that at this time no Miranda warning had been given
(R. 52). The lower court further found the appellant guilty of an intent to
distribute a controlled substance despite the appellant's contention that he
intended to distribute it only in Idaho (R. 161). Finally, the court allowed
a large quantity of marijuana to be admitted as evidence against the appellant
even though it had been obtained by a search and seizure conducted without
a search warrant (R. 172).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE AIRPLANE OF
WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS THE PILOT IS INADMISSIBLE AS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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AND SEIZURE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SEARCH
WARRANT AND BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT
MUST BE OBTAINED INCIDENT TO ARREST UNLESS
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH AS TO
JUSTIFY A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT FIRST
OBTAINING A SEARCH WARRANT.
In order to afford the appellant's uniform constitutional safeguards under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that standards and criteria set
forth in the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court are binding
upon state courts. This rule is set forth in Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963). All eight members participating in the decision of this Court
agreed that they would review the California case to determine whether
the "constitutional criteria established by this Court have been respected"
with regard to search and seizure procedures (374 U.S» at 34).
On numerous occasions the United States Supreme Court has
stated the general requirement that searches and seizures are to be made
only with a search warrant, unless an emergency situation arises which
would justify a search and seizure without a warranto The Court in
McDonald v. United States, 355 U.S. 451 at 455, 456 (1948) stated:
We are not dealing with formalities« The
presence of a search warrant serves a high
function. Absent some grave emergency, the
Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . .
We cannot be true to that constitutional
requirement and excuse the absence of a
search warrant without showing by those who
seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made
that course imperative,, (Emphasis added0)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the instant case, the challenged search and seizure was made without
a search warranto Therefore, according to McE)onald, supra, the respondent had the burden of proving that there was a "grave emergency" situation
justifying the absence of a warrant.
The Supreme Court in Chimel v c California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),
held that there are two grave emergency situations, i.e<>, "exigent circumstances, ff whereby a police officer may search a person he has just arrested
and the area within the arrestee 1 s immediate control without a search
warrant:
(1)

Where the police officer is searching to
remove any weapons in order to protect
himself and prevent the suspect's escape;

(2)

Where the police officer is searching for
incriminating evidence in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction.

The Supreme Court in Chimel, supra, found that the search of the defendant's
home and cars after he had been arrested on the doorstep of his home was
unconstitutional. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court said:
The search here went far beyond the petitioner's
person and the area from within which he might
have obtained either a weapon or something that
could have been used as evidence. There is no
constitutional justification, in the absence of a
search warrant, for extending the search beyond
thatarea. 395 U.S 0 at 768.
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly
followed Chimel, supra. In United States v, Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.
1969), a post-Chimel decision, the defendant had been arrested for parole
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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violation at his home. At the time of his arrest the officers observed
some drug paraphernalia and proceeded to search the premises without
a search warrant. Heroin was seized during the warrantless search.
The Tenth Circuit in holding that the search and seizure of the heroin
was unlawful said:
The area within the immediate control
of the defendant may be searched and
evidence or weapons seized without a
warrant when made incident to a lawful
arrest. . . . Moreover, it cannot be
said that the night stand, under the bed
or any similar area was under any type
of control by Baca inasmuch as he was
handcuffed with his hands behind his
back and was unable to even dress himself. 417 F.2d at 105.
The court went further to say:
The rule has been long established that
whenever practicable an officer must
secure a search warrant. . 0 . It is
difficult to understand how or why it was
not practicable for one of the five officers
to obtain a search warrant based on
probable cause resulting from the finding
of the two vials and narcotics paraphernalia. 417 Fo2d at 105-106.
In the instant case, testimony by the appellant and police
officers indicated that the appellant was some twenty to thirty feet away
from the airplane when the arrest was made (R. 63). The police then
reasonably searched the appellant for any weapons in order to protect
themselves (R. 54). This search of the person of the appellant was justified by both Chimel and Baca, supra. However, after the police
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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handcuffed the appellant and placed him in the police car (R. 55), there
was no further justification under the rationale of Chimel and Baca, supra,
to search the airplane which was out of the immediate control of the appellant (R. 90, 103). After the police searched the appellant1 s person in order
to protect themselves, no further exigent circumstances existed. In searching the airplane, the police were in no way attempting to protect themselves
or to prevent the appellant's escape. Furthermore, there could have been
no apprehension on their part that the evidence in the airplane would be
destroyed or concealed because, as in Baca, supra, where the arrestee was
handcuffed and in custody, the appellant in the instant case was likewise
handcuffed and placed in the police c a r . According to Chimel and Baca,
supra, a search warrant is absolutely mandatory for a search extending
beyond the area within the appellant's immediate control.
Evidence from the trial further indicated that before the airplane
was searched, the arresting officer telephoned Sheriff Wright in Monticello
to assist in the search of the airplane (R. 87). The contents of the airplane
were not seized until after Sheriff Wright arrived at the Blanding airport
(R. 90). Sheriff Wright testified that there were two justices of the peace
in Blanding, a mere four miles from the Blanding airport (R. 67, 116). In
other words, the appellant was handcuffed and in custody of three policemen
while Sheriff Wright was traveling from Monticello to the Blanding airport
and passing right by the offices of two magistrates authorized to issue search
warrants. Yet, neither Sheriff Wright nor any of the policemen obtained a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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search warrant which would have been practicable and convenient under
the circumstances. Similar circumstances existed in Baca, supra,
wherein the court stated:
It is difficult to understand how or why
it was not practicable for one of the
five officers to obtain a search warrant
based on probable cause . . . . 417
Fo2d at 105 -106.
In the instant case it was not only practicable as required by Baca, supra,
but also convenient for the officers to obtain a search warrant before
searching the airplane which was some thirty feet from the appellant who
was handcuffed and in custody 0 The failure of the officers to obtain the
mandatory search warrant was a direct violation of the appellant's Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Chimel and Baca, supra, dealt with the legality of a "premise
search"; however, it is clear that the same limitations apply to "vehicle
searchesc u In United States v. Mclntyre, 304 F . Supp. 1244 (E.D. La.
1969), a post-Chimel case, the defendants were arrested twenty feet from
their automobile, but the police searched the vehicle anyway without a
search warrant. The Court upheld the motion to suppress by holding:
[T]he situation did not demand immediate
seizure of whatever was inside their
vehicle. Defendants, apparently unarmed
and standing twenty feei away, could not
have reached objects in rhe car, either to
threaten the policemen or to destroy evidence . With three officers and two police
cars available to guard the car and the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suspects, there was no excuse for failing
to obtain a warrant before searching the
automobile, 304 F 0 Supp, at 1246.
(Emphasis added o)
Since the limitation of Chimel, supra, has been applied to automobile searches, there is no reason not to apply it to airplane searches 0
In the instant case where the appellant was arrested thirty feet away from
the airplane, handcuffed, and placed in the custody of three policemen,
there was no excuse for failing to obtain a search warrant before searching
the airplane 0
The Supreme Court in Coolidge vc New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), stated that simply because contraband is in plain view incident to a
lawful arrest, the contraband cannot be seized without a search warrant
absent exigent circumstances, regardless of the fullest amount of probable
cause, Coolidge, supra, stands for the proposition that a seizure of contraband in plain view where no search is necessary is subject to constitutional
limitations:
The limits on the doctrine [plain view] are
implicit in the statement of its rationale.
The first of these is that plain view alone is
never enough to justify the warrantless
seizure of evidence. This is simply a
corollary of the familiar principle discussed
above, that no amount of probable cause can
justify a warrantless search or seizure absent
'exigent circumstance's"? incontrovertible
testimony of the senses that an incriminating
object is on premises belonging to a criminal
suspect may establish the fullest possible
measure of probable cause. But even where
the object is contraband, this Court has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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repeatedly stated and enforced the basic
rule that the police may not enter and
make a warrantless seizure. 403 U.S.
at 468. (Emphasis added.)
The facts of the instant case indicate that the police could see
plastic bags in the airplane by looking through the windows and could also
smell the presence of marijuana (R. 88). Thus, they had probable cause
to believe that the airplane carried contraband because of the 'Incontrovertible testimony of their senses." Yet, the Court in Coolidge, supra,
stated that even with indisputable probable cause, the police could not
seize contraband in plain view unless exigent circumstances existed.
Because exigent circumstances did not exist, in that there was no possibility that the evidence would be destroyed, the seizure of the marijuana
without a search warrant was illegal and the marijuana should not be
admissible as evidence against the appellant.
While Coolidge, supra, involved a seizure of automobiles in
plain view, that case has also been applied to evidence in plain view within
' an automobile. It is therefore reasonable to apply the Coolidge limitations
to contraband in plain view in airplanes. In a recent Montana case,
State v. Amor, 520 P02d 773 (Mont. S. Ct. 1974), the police looked
through the windows of a parolee's parked car and saw what appeared to
be a box of rifle ammunition on the seat. Knowing that parolees were not
permitted to possess weapons, the police seized the box of ammunition
and further searched the vehicle without a search warrant. The Supreme

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court of Montana, in affirming the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence, stated:
In the instant case the presence of the
ammunition box in the automobile and
knowledge that Amor, the registered owner,
was a parolee who matched the general
description of the burglar were facts contributing to the existence of probable cause,
not exigent circumstances 0 . . . In the
instant case we find that it was both p r a c ticable and mandatory that the officers
obtain a valid warrant before conducting
a search of Amor's parked, unoccupied
automobile. 520 P c 2d at 775. (Emphasis
added.)
The instant case is similar to Amor, supra, because in both
factual situations probable cause had been established. And Amor, supra,
held that existence of probable cause did not permit the officers to seize
evidence in plain view inside a vehicle without a search w a r r a n t . It must
be remembered that plain view alone is not an exigent circumstance.
Rather, exigent circumstances exist only when the officers a r e trying to
protect themselves o r prevent the destruction of evidence (Chimel, supra).
In the instant case there were no exigent circumstances when the officers
seized the marijuana which was in plain view in the airplane. The officers
relied on the plain view doctrine alone to justify their warrantless search
and seizure which was illegal according to the standards of Chimel, Coolidge,
and Amor, supra.
In the instant case the trial court justified the seizure of the
marijuana from the airplane by relying on three Utah cases dealing with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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search and seizure (R. 162, 163, 164): State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41,
395 P.2d 535 (1964); State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503.P.2d 848 (1972);
and State v0 Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 (1972).
Of course, Allred, supra, is no support for the trial court's
position in the instant case because Allred, supra, was decided prior to
and overruled by both Chimel and Coolidge, supra.
Neither is Shields, supra, support for the trial court's position
in the instant case because there were exigent circumstances present in
Shields, supra, as required by Chimel and Coolidge, supra, which justified
the warrantless search of an automobile which was stopped on the highway.
In Shields, supra, this court held:
[A] search warrant is unnecessary where
there is probable cause to search an
automobile stopped on the highway, for
the car is movable, the occupants alerted,
and the car's contents may never be
found a in if a w aidant us*: be obtained.
503 P.2c at 849c (Emph^is added.)
Even though this court used the phrase "probable cause" and not the phrase
"exigent circumstances" in Shields, supra, this court still found exigent
circumstances to exist because it found that alerted occupants could have
moved the car and its contents before a warrant could have been obtained.
No such exigent circumstances existed in the instant case because the
appellant was the sole occupant of the airplane. He was handcuffed and in
custody 0 Surely he posed no threat that the airplane and its contents would
be moved or destroyed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Martinez, supra, the remaining case cited in support of the trial
court's position in the instant case, was decided after Coolidge, supra,
which held that a warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view where no
search was necessary may only be valid with the presence of exigent c i r -

x

cumstances. The scant record of Martinez, supra, (less than one page) does
not indicate whether exigent circumstances existed e Nor did this court cite
therein any cases whatsoever to justify its bare holding that seizure of
evidence in plain view in an automobile was lawful.
If indeed no exigent circumstances existed in Martinez, supra,
this court's holding therein is clearly contrary to the federal standards in
Coolidge, supra. And Ker, supra, holds that federal standards must be
applied to state cases.
In both Amor (Montana) and Martinez (Utah), supra, the incriminating evidence was seen in plain view through the window of an unoccupied
parked automobile and was seized without a search warrant. In Amor, supra,
the Montana Supreme Court following Ker, supra, specifically cited Coolidge,
supra, in holding that if exigent circumstances did not exist there could be
no lawful seizure of evidence even though it was in plain view.
A search and seizure of evidence in plain view incident to a lawful
arrest is valid only when circumstances are such that the police are trying
to protect themselves, trying to prevent escape, or trying to prevent the
concealment or destruction of incriminating evidence. Chimel, supra 0
These are the only exigent circumstances which justify a seizure of evidence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in plain view without a search warrant. Contraband in plain view establishes probable cause for arrest but does not alone justify a warrantless
seizure of the contraband. Exigent circumstances must also exist.
Coolidge, supra. No exigent circumstances existed in the instant case
at the time of the search or seizure; i . e . , the officers were not attempting to protect themselves; the officers were not attempting to prevent the
escape of the appellant; the officers were not attempting to prevent the
airplane from being moved; nor were the officers attempting to prevent
the destruction of the marijuana. Therefore, the seizure of the marijuana
in the instant case was unreasonable and unlawful; the marijuana should
not have been admitted into evidence at the trial; and the appellant's conviction and sentence should be reversed by this court.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AS DEFINED BY MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
BECAUSE HE WAS INTERROGATED WHILE IN
CUSTODY WITHOUT HAVING BEEN INFORMED OF
HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
Under the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
appellant is entitled by the Fifth Amendment, when in custody and prior
to any interrogation, to be informed of his "right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." 384 U.S. at 444. The evidence clearly reveals that at the
time appellant made the statement that the airplane was "full of pot" (R. 52)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
no Miranda warning had been given to him by any officer 0
The sole significant issue pertaining to the Miranda warning as

•

applied to the instant case is whether there was custodial interrogation.

I

In deciding Miranda, supra, the Supreme Court was explicit in its definition
of the term "custodial interrogation by stating:

"

By custodial interrogation we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significantway. 384 U.S« at 444,

I
•
I
*

In the instant case the appellant was surrounded by three law enforcement

I

officers at gun point (R 0 39, 132). The appellant knew he was surrounded

.

by police and felt that if he had moved, they would have shot him (Rc 133) •
The appellant was indeed in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom

I

of action in a significant way as required by Miranda, supra, after which

•

one law enforcement officer asked the appellant for some identification
(R. 42, 146), and another law enforcement officer asked, "What is in the

|

airplane?" (R. 147). The appellant responded that the airplane was "loaded

i

with pot" (R. 52, 149). No Miranda warning had yet been given the appellant by the law enforcement officers. The appellant was in custody before

|

the questioning was initiated by the law enforcement officers.

|

-

Courts interpreting Miranda, supra, have repeatedly stressed

that the emphasis is upon the person's reasonable belief as to whether he
was free to leave. In People v. Ellingsen, 65 Cah Rptr. 744 (1968), a
16 year old boy was taken to the police station for questioning with regard
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
-16-

j
!
. ;

to the murder of his s i s t e r . The prosecutor later tried to use the boy's
statements as evidence at his murder trial 0 The issue was whether the
boy was in custody. The California Court of Appeals, deciding that he
was, stated:
For a person to be regarded as being
f
in custody 1 for purposes of giving
required warnings under the Miranda
decision, it is not necessary that he be
under a r r e s t and custody occurs if the
suspect is physically deprived of freedom
in any significant way or is led to believe,
as a reasonable person, that he is so
deprived o 65 Cal. Rptr« at 744.
At the time the incriminating statement was made by the
appellant in the instant case, the appellant reasonably believed that his
freedom of action was significantly impaired (R. 133, 135) within the
meaning of Ellingsen, supra.
Therefore, the appellant 1 s Fifth Amendment rights have been
violated, his incriminating statement should not have been admitted in
evidence at the trial, and his conviction and sentence by the lower court
should be r e v e r s e d .
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH LACKED JURISDICTION TO PUNISH THE APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE BECAUSE HE
INTENDED TO DISTRIBUTE THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE ONLY IN IDAHO.
To convict appellant for illegal possession of a controlled
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substance with intent to distribute for value under Utah Code Annotated
§ 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii) (Suppc 1973), the respondent must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant had an intent to distribute a controlled
substance in Utah. The trial court found that the appellant was transporting
marijuana to Idaho and merely stopped in Blanding, Utah, to refuel his
airplane (R. 160) „ The intent to distribute pertained only to Idaho, and the
record is clear that appellant had no intent to distribute marijuana in UtahG
There can be no presumption that the appellant intended to d i s tribute in Utah merely because he was in possession of a large quantity of
marijuana within Utah. While Utah courts are silent on this point, recent
case law of other jurisdictions concludes that intent to distribute cannot be
presumed from mere possession. In State v . O'Meally, 95 Idaho 202, 506
P.2d 99 (1973), the defendant was charged with possession with intent to
deliver 38 tablets of amphetamine sulphate, .061 g r a m s of cocaine hydrochloride, and 62 0 23 g r a m s of marijuana.

In affirming the dismissal of the

complaint, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that an intent to deliver a controlled substance could not be inferred from m e r e possession. In a similar
case, Redden v. State, 281 A.2d 490 (Del c Supr. 1971), the defendant was
convicted of possession with intent to sell 12 ounces and 29 sealed envelopes
of marijuana c In reversing his conviction, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated:
It was, of course, incumbent upon the
state to prove the element of intent to
sell, as well as other elements of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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offense by competent evidence sufficient
to justify submission of the issue to the
jury. . . . We hold, therefore, that
there was not sufficient evidence of
intent to sell in this case to warrant
submission of the case to the jury.
281 A.2d at 491.
In State v 0 Fitzpatrick, 491 Pc2d 262 (Wash. App. 1972), a
very similar fact situation to the instant case was presented. The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell after having transported 76 bricks of marijuana by plane across the Canadian border in
Washington. A Washington statute provided for a presumption of intent
to sell from the fact of possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana.
Yet the court, reversing the defendant's conviction, stated:
The trier of fact need give such a presumption only such weight as it seems to
merit. . . . Where a defendant's acts
are patently equivocal, a criminal intent to
sell the marijuana cannot be inferred from
the overt act of possession of that amount
atone. 491 P.2d at 266-267.
The Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Annotated
§ 57-37-8, under which appellant was convicted, includes no statutory
presumption of intent to sell from the fact of mere possession. Furthermore, QTMeally, Redden, and Fitzpatrick, supra, indicate that the
respondent cannot make such a presumption. In the instant case, absolutely no evidence whatsoever was offered by the respondent of the
appellant's intent to distribute in Utah. Simply because appellant was
in possession of a large quantity of marijuana within Utah boundaries
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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does not mean that he intended to distribute marijuana within Utahu
The lower court found that Utah had jurisdiction to punish the
appellant for intent to deliver a controlled substance in Utah, even though
he intended to transport the marijuana only to Idaho (R. 160) 0 The lower
court relied in pertinent part upon Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-201 (2),
which states that a person is subject to prosecution in this state if the
offense is committed wholly or partially within this state. Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-201 (2) further provides:
(2)

An offense is committed partly within
this state if either the conduct which
is an element of the offense, or the
result which is such an element, occurs
within this state.

Despite this statute, Utah lacks jurisdiction to punish the appellant for an intent to distribute outside Utah's borders because the appellant's
conduct nor its result was an element of the offense to distribute in Idaho.
California has a statute almost identical to Utah's jurisdictional statute 0
Subdivision (1) of Section 27 of the California Penal Code provides that
persons may be punished "under the laws of this state" if they "commit, in
whole or in part, any crime within this state." Section 778(a) of that code
further provides:
Whenever a person, with intent to commit
a crime, does any act within this state in
execution or part execution of such intent,
which culminates in the commission of a
crime, either within or without this state,
such person is punishable for such crime
in this state in the same manner as if the
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same had been committed entirely within
this state.
The case of People v, Buffum, 256 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1953),
interprets the California statute and indicates when a state may punish
a person when that person intends to commit a crime outside the boundaries of that state. In Buffum, supra, the defendants were doctors who
were residents of California. They performed abortions on several
women in Mexico. The trial court convicted defendants of conspiracy to
use certain means to induce miscarriages. Yet, the defendants did not
intend to commit abortions in California, only in Mexico 0 In reversing
their convictions, the California Supreme Court stated:
To read such a statute as authorizing
punishment by one state of acts which
do not amount to an attempt but are
merely preparatory to the commission
of a crime in another state would seem
tantamount to an effort to regulate conduct in the other jurisdiction. 256 P.2d
at 320.
The California court further held that before it could have jurisdiction
over an individual intending to commit a crime beyond its borders, the
acts of the defendant must have constituted at least an attempt to commit
the offense 0 An intent to commit a crime outside the boundaries of
California did not give the California court jurisdiction.
The appellant in the instant case did not attempt or even intend
to distribute marijuana within Utah. Therefore, according to Buffum,
supra, a case dealing with California statutes similar to those Utah
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statutes under which the lower court claimed jurisdiction over the appellant,
Utah courts should not have jurisdiction over a crime intended to take place
outside Utah.
A case similar to Buffum, supra, is People v. Werblow, 241 NoY.
55, 148 N . E . 786 (1925). The court in that case dealt with a New York
statute which gave New York courts jurisdiction of 1fa person who commits
within the state any crime, in whole or in part." 148 N . E . at 788. The
New York court in reversing the conviction of defendant who conspired to
commit grand larceny outside the boundaries of New York stated:
We think a crime is not committed either
wholly or partly in this state, unless the act
within this state is so related to the crime
that if nothing more had followed, it would
amount to an attempt. 148 N . E . at 789.
It is clear that the appellant in the instant case did nothing which
would amount to an attempt to distribute a controlled substance in Utah.
According to Buffum and Werblow, supra, in order for a state to have jurisdiction over a person intending to commit a crime outside the boundaries
of that state, the person must have performed an act within the state
amounting to an attempt to commit the crime for which he is charged 0
The appellant in the instant case is charged with intent to distribute a controlled substance in Utahc Utah has claimed jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the fact that the appellant intended to distribute outside Utah and in no way
attempted to distribute in Utah. In light of the fact that Buffum and Werblow,
supra, hold that an intent alone to commit a crime outside the borders of a
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state does not give that state jurisdiction, the conviction of the appellant
for intent to distribute a controlled substance must be reversed for lack
of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The appellant was denied his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
The appellant was denied his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
The appellant was denied his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights against due process and equal protection of the law because of the
lower court's lack of jurisdiction.
Therefore, the appellant's conviction and sentence by the lower
court should be reversed.
DATED this 18th day of July, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,
DUANE A. FRANDSEN
90 West Firth North
Price, Utah 84501
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

ril L . Hansen
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